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independent contractors would be the use of a statutory definition of
"principal contractor" that would include such owners, but this would
broaden the actual meaning of the term "contractor." A provision
which might be wise and beneficial would subject an employer to
liability for compensation to employees of any of his contractors in any
case where the employer furnishes labor and/or machinery to a con-
tractor on the basis of a presumption that, under such circumstances,
the employer of the contractor is contracting for work that he would
ordinarily do himself.
The Kentucky and Tennessee statutes as presently worded do not
contain language broad enough to cover such situations, and the mean-
ing of the term "principal contractor" should not be expanded in order
to place liability on those who are not contractors by profession. Such
expansion should come, if at all, through legislative action.
P. JoA SEAcGs
TORTS-INTERVENING NEGLIGENT AND INTENTIONAL
ACTS AS RELIEVING A NEGLIGENT ACTOR FROM LIABILITY
Liability of a negligent actor for injury to another's person or
property may present a difficult question where an intervening inde-
pendent negligent or intentionally tortious act of some third person
is the direct or immediate cause of the injury. The problem is not one
which can be disposed of wholly in terms either of proximate cause
or of duty to the injured party. The purpose of this note is to examine
the Kentucky decisions and attempt to reconcile them by using the
tests applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, and also to present
some other factors which are of prime importance in determining the
basis of liability in these cases. No attempt will be made to go out-
side the Kentucky cases except to point out certain fundamental prin-
ciples which bear on the subject, and to compare the rule in Kentucky
with the general rule in other states. For purposes of clarity and em-
phasis the subject will be covered in the following order:
1) The ordinary case where an intentionally tortious or criminal
act of a third person intervenes.
2) The ordinary case where a negligent act of a third person
intervenes.
3) Certain cases where, because of some social relationships
recognized by law, the defendant has an affirmative duty to control
the acts of the intenvening third party.
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American courts have recognized the doctrine that the earlier of
two wrongdoers, even though his wrong has only created a force or
the condition on which an intervening wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's
injury, is not necessarily relieved from liability merely because the
subsequent act of the intervening wrongdoer has been a means by
which his own misconduct was made harmful.' In the ordinary case
the test has come to be whether the subsequent act was "foreseeable"
by the first negligent actor-or stated more completely, whether in
view of the surrounding circumstances and the conditions which the
defendant's conduct may be expected to create, the third party's sub-
sequent action was normal, and so, expectable.2 In applying this test,
much depends upon the character of the intervening act in determining
whether or not it should have been anticipated.3 The general rule
throughout the United States as pertains to intervening willful or
criminal acts is that the causal chain between the negligence and the
accident is broken only where such act could not have been foreseen
by the negligent actor.4
While most of the courts in this country have recognized that
intentionally tortious and criminal acts are sometimes foreseeable under
the particular circumstances, this general rule has not been followed
150 HARv. L. REv. 1225, 1229 (1936-37). See also RESTATEMENT, ToRTs
Sec. 439 (1938).
<RESTATEmENT, ToRTs sec. 447 (1938): "The fact that an intervening act
of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not
make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent con-
duct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b)
a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person
was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had
so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by
the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily
negligent." (Note that this section applies only to intervening negligent acts. It
is suggested that it may be applied also in cases of intervening intentional and
criminal acts).
38 Am. Jut. 727 (1941). Also see ProssER, TORTS 248 (1941): "There is
usually much less reason to anticipate acts which are malicious or criminal than
those which are merely negligent. . . . But there are situations which would be
recognized by any reasonable man as affording an especial temptation and oppor-
tunity for criminal misconduct, and demanding precautions against it.
IId. at 728. Also see RESTATEMENT, TORTS sec. 448. "The act of a third per-
son in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to
another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situa-
tion which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or
crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized
the likelihood that such a situation might be created thereby and that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime."
(Note that this test seems to be mere surplusage. It is suggested that with
respect to intentional and criminal intervention, the same rule can be applied as
that expressed in RESTATEmENT, TORTS sec. 447, which pertains to negligent in-
tervening acts.) Also see PROSSER, TORTS 367 (1941). (In dealing with in-
tentional and criminal intervening acts, note that Prosser says it is more a "prob-
lem of duty to protect the plaintiff against such an intervening cause").
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in Kentucky. An exhaustive search into the Kentucky decisions has
failed to reveal a single case (in the absence of certain social relation-
ships) where a plaintiff has recovered for injuries to his person or
property by the defendant where an intentionally tortious or criminal
act intervened which was directly responsible for the injury. While
most courts profess to limit the original wrongdoer's responsibility to
cases where such intervention was expectable or foreseeable, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has taken the position that such acts are never
expectable. Watson v. Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Co.,5 which was
cited with approval in a recent Kentucky case,6 is illustrative of the
general attitude of the Kentucky courts toward intervening criminal
acts. In this case the plaintiff was seriously injured as a result of
an explosion following the derailment of a railroad tank car containing
gasoline. The explosion occurred when a bystander threw a lighted
match onto the street which ignited the combustible gas arising from
the gasoline flowing in the street. The negligence charged was the
failure of the defendant to maintain in a safe condition the roadbed
and track at the point of derailment. The trial court peremptorily
instructed the jury in favor of the defendant. Although this decision
was reversed on appeal because of a conflict in testimony, the Court
of Appeals made clear its standing on intervening criminal acts. It
said that if the act of this bystander was malicious and willful then
it was one which the defendant could not have anticipated. This
conclusion is reached from the court's language when it stated:
• . . if the intervening agency is something so unexpected or extra-
ordinary as that he could not or ought not to have anticipated it, he
will not be liable, and certainly he is not bound to anticipate the
criminal acts of others by which damage is inflicted .... 7
It should be kept in mind in reading these cases that even though
the court may speak in terms of expectable and extraordinary acts, the
feeling seems to be that intentional and criminal acts are never foresee-
able. Is there any need to speak of unexpected or extraordinary acts
in the face of a state policy which prohibits liability in every case of
willful intervention? At any rate, regardless of the theory used to
exonerate the defendant from liability, the controlling question in
'137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910).
'Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, 295 Ky. 156, 173 S.W. 2d 993
(1943) (Note that here there was not substantial evidence tending to show that
the unknown person who threw the match did so willfully or maliciously). See
also Noonan v. Sheridan, 230 Ky. 162, 18 S.W. 2d 976 (1929) (There was
no evidence that the roll of linoleum would have toppled over on plaintiff except
for the willful act of some boys pushing it over).
Note that the Watson case pertained only to intervening criminal acts, but
it is believed that the same rule is followed in cases of mere willful intervention.
Supra note 5, at 634, 126 S.W. at 151.
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such cases, and the one which will help the reader best to visualize
the problem, is how far is society willing to go in requiring the negli-
gent defendant to pay for damages which his conduct has been a sub-
stantial factor in producing? It can be said with assurance that Ken-
tucky's policy, unlike that of most states, forbids the courts to carry the
responsibility of a negligent actor to cases where an intentional or
criminal act intervenes.
This strict line which has been drawn with respect to intervening
wiful acts seems to be the only absolute limitation on the defendant's
liability as far as foreseeability is concerned. Certainly it can be said
that Kentucky has followed the general rule with respect to intervening
negligent acts, by extending the responsibility of the original wrong-
doer in such cases." In order to excuse the defendant in cases where
another negligent act intervenes, such act must amount to a super-
seding cause.9
It has been suggested that if the intervening negligence so entirely
supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone
can be said to have caused the injury, without the defendant's negli-
gence contributing thereto, then it operates as a superseding cause'0
relieving the defendant from liability. It is submitted that this test
is more confusing than helpful, and that in cases of intervening
negligent as well as intentional acts, the same rule can be applied
which is that expressed in the Restatement of Torts.-' Under this rule
one must decide only whether the act of the intervening negligent
actor was so abnormal or extraordinary that the defendant should not
or could not have foreseen it. After the negligence of both parties
has been established, it is much easier for one to understand what a
'Dixon v. Kentucky Utilities Co. 295 Ky. 32, 174 S.W. 2d 19 (1943) (negli-
gent driver of vehicle struck defendants electric pole carrying sagging wire, causing
it to come in contact with barbed wire fence); United States Natural Gas Co. v.
Hicks, 134 Ky. 12, 119 S.W. 166 (1909) (Young child threw a match into box
covering defendants' defective gate valve); Louisville Home Telephone Co. v.
Gasper, 123 Ky. 128, 93 S.W. 1057 (1906) (negligent driver of vehicle ran upon
a guy wire negligently anchored by defendant telephone co. and caromed into a
pedestrian); Whitman McNamara Tobacco Co. v. Wurm, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2120,
66 S.W. 609 (1902) (plaintiff was carelessly bumped into scalding hot water
negligently discharged into gutter by defendant).
'REsTAT crENT, onTs sec. 440 (1938): "A superseding cause is an act of
a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from
being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about." Also see MsETATEMENT, ToRTs sec. 442 (Considera-
tions important in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding
cause of harm to another).
"Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. of PA. L. 1EV.
121 (1937-38).
'Supra note 2, Clause (b): . . . "a reasonable man knowing the situation
existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly
extraordinary that the third person bad so acted .. " Also see Momus, ToRts 191
(1953).
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"highly extraordinary act" is than to try to visualize the complexities
of other superseding cause tests.
There is a third class of cases where certain relationships exist
between the negligent actor and the intervening wrongdoer or the
injured party. In such cases the law imposes an affirmative duty upon
one person to attempt to control another's conduct to avoid an un-
reasonable risk to a third person. It is well settled in the law today
that there is ordinarily no general duty to act for the protection of
others.12 There are, however, certain social relationships which con-
stitute a basis for this legal duty.13 University of Louisville v. Ham-
mock14 is an unusual case which is illustrative of this duty to control
the conduct of others. The plaintiff, a patient at the defendant's in-
firmary, was injured when she was attacked by another patient who
was afflicted with delirium tremens. The latter had been left in charge
of a single nurse who was utterly powerless to restrain him. He broke
away from her, and upon entering the plaintiff's room, seized her
and dragged her from her bed. In the opinion of the court no mention
was made of an intervening act on the part of the assailant which
might relieve the infirmary from liability. Indeed, the negligence of
the defendant was in failing to confine such a dangerous person. The
rule of this case is supported by abundant authority, especially in the
realm of common carriers. 15
It is suggested that these duty to control cases are not real inter-
vening cause cases in the true sense and liability is more a question
of scope of responsibility than of foreseeability, and the fixing of duty is
more clearly a question of policy than it is in the ordinary case.16 In
the ordinary case the intervening act is done independently of the
negligent act of the defendant; his act merely creates a condition on
which the wrongful intervenor acts. In the special relationship cases,
there is an affirmative duty on the part of the defendant to control the
conduct of the intervening actor. The negligence charged will be the
failure to control the very act which might operate to relieve the de-
fendant in the true intervention case.
In conclusion, the writer suggests that in attempting to analyze
cases where an intervening act occurs, it should first be decided
"PossER, Toars 357 (1941).
"Id. at 249.
14127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907).
"See Cashen v. Riney, 289 Ky. 779, 40 S.W. 2d 389 (1931) ("A person
standing temporarily in loco parentis may not shut his eyes to obvious dan er
threatening the moral or physical well-being of the child committed to his custody.
.."). Of the many common carrier cases, the following will suffice: Miller v.
Mills, 257 S.W. 2d 520 (Ky. 1953); Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. McEwan,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 487, 51 S.W. 619 (1899).
" Momus, TORTS 185-187 (1953).
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whether it falls within the last mentioned class of social relationships.
If not, then the character of the act should be given some considera-
tion. It may be that the policy of the state is against binding anyone
to anticipate certain kinds of acts. Thirdly, it is submitted that even
though the court may speak in terms of an independent superseding
cause, the case will be better understood if one applies the test of
"extraordinary or abnormal acts" as a criteria of foreseeability in cases




The early common law rule that one who had been convicted of
an infamous crime was deemed incompetent to testify in a court of
law has been generally modified or abrogated by statutes. Neverthe-
less, these statutes, usually by express terms, subject witnesses, whether
the action be civil or criminal, to impeachment by proving a previous
conviction of some crime.' This previous conviction will generally be
brought out as bearing on the credibility of the witness, and there is
great disagreement as to the types and degree of crime which may be
used for this purpose. There appear to be three general classes. The
majority of jurisdictions takes the view that the crime must be a felony
before it can be used for impeachment purposes; a growing minority
of the jurisdictions which have statutes permitting prior conviction of
crime to be shown has construed the word crime as including both
felonies and misdemeanors; in Texas and a few other jurisdictions
evidence as to previous conviction of crime for the purpose of effecting
a witness's credibility must relate to offenses involving moral turpi-
tude.
2
In general these rules are applied without making any distinction
as to whether the case is civil or criminals and whether the accused
or a third party testifies.4 At least one jurisdiction differentiates be-
tween the criminal defendant and the third party witness by holding
that the latter may be cross-examined to establish his conviction while
the former is free from the risks of such cross-examination. 5 In nearly
158 Am. Jusi. 897 (1948).
' See 2 WIo~Mor, EVIDENCE sec. 987 (1940), as to the statutes of the various
jurisdictions.
'See supra note 1.
' Kimbrough v. State, 66 Okla. Crim. Rep. 66, 89 P. 2d 982 (1939).
'People v. Halkens, 386 Ill. 167, 53 N.E. 2d 923 (1944).
